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The Law of Necessity
Mr. Hugh Gotein, of Gray's Inn, made a very useful
observation when he defined law as "the sum of the in-
fluences that determine decisions in courts of justice."
Among these "influences that determine decisions" may be
enumerated rules, principles and concepts. Every concept
or leading idea is the product of an abstracting process
more or less exhaustive; and legal concepts are often found
in the fields of current notions of morality and of practical
wisdom. Very frequently we see such concepts resorted to
when a court decides a case "on first principles".
In the realm of jurisprudence there are at least two
aspects of the law of necessity, one of law originating in
necessity and the other the law of cases of necessity.
Both principles shade almost imperceptibly into the doc-
trine of convenience-sometimes into the doctrine of social
utility.1 It has been remarked by Dr. Lieber that every
idea has its caricature, and a not uncommon caricature of the
idea of "necessity" is one involving the gratification of an
eager desire to accomplish a cherished purpose. Such a
distortion we find when Cromwell sought to extenuate
illegal conduct by asserting that "necessity hath no law."
This is, of course, an extreme illustration of a fallacy
which has wrought much mischief on many occasions.
Milton mistrusted the concept of necessity for he deemed
it "the tyrant's plea." Mr. Justice Baldwin disagrees with
both views, for in a homicide case,2 he discusses a "law of
necessity". Both the Cromwellian and the Miltonian views
are useful as sign-posts pointing out the dangerous lengths
to which the doctrine of necessity might be stretched, if
not curbed by due observance of principles of justice and
fair play to say nothing of the ancient rule, summum ius,
'The concept of necessity has at all times been a causal source of
common or court-developed law, and is frequently primordial.
2United States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1, 22, 23 (U. S. C. C. 1842).
Furthermore, Coke has cited Bracton, fol. 247a, as authority for a
maxim, "Necessitas facit licitum quod alias non licitur. Necessity
makes that law which otherwise is unlawful." 10 Co. 61 (1792 ed.)
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surmma injuria. That the danger is real and not merely
speculative is apparent when we find writers of consider-
able ability citing the case of DeLima v. Bidwell3 as an
authority for Congress to assume power by necessity and
not by authority of the Constitution-a proposition which
sounds like a doctrine of coup d'etat. Those of us who
respect the warnings of President Coolidge and many oth-
ers against suffering the States of the Union to sink to the
level of French departments or municipal corporations are
alive to the dangers of such a political theory. It is true
that the language of the majority opinion in DeLima v.
Bidwell, will support the position objected to, for we find
it stated that "the assumed authority of Congress to govern
and control the Territories is an authority which arises not
necessarily from the territorial clauses of the Constitution,
but from the necessities of the case, and from the inability
of the States to act upon the subject."'4 But if we remember,
as Chief Justice Marshall and many others have pointed
out, that the Constitution is not to be treated as a mere
code; and in addition, if we recall the specific constitutional
powers of Congress, "To make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution***all powers vested
***;" and apply such authority to the Territorial clause
we can support the result arrived at in De Lima v. Bidwell,
without doing violence to the letter or spirit of the Consti-
tution, and be in no danger of losing sight of the funda-
mental principle that the powers of Congress are delegated
and not inherent.5 In addition to this, inasmuch as one of
the many secondary meanings of the word "necessity" is
desirability, a roughly approximate statement of the
authority to enact "laws necessary and proper," would be
that it sanctions all legislation deemed advisable by its en-
3182 U. S. 1 (1900).
'At page 196.
5Almost immediately after drafting the foregoing, the present
writer found the following passage in the case of Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920); "It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an
act of Congress could not deal with."
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actors, which is within the limits of constitutionality. 6
Here it may be remarked that Mr. Dooley's oft-quoted
pleasantry that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns, was a keen observation of the fact that legislation
in accord with the felt necessities of the times, will be
sustained by that tribunal, so far as such enactments are
found to be permitted by a Constitution which contem-
plates a government of delegated powers.7 In this connec-
tion it may be observed that the constitutionality of a
statute may depend upon environmental facts; for it has
been held that a law valid when enacted may be rendered
invalid through later changed circumstances;8 and con-
versely, it has been decided that a law invalid at one time
may become valid under a change of conditions.' The law
of necessity sometimes compels courts to ignore statutory
requirements impossible to comply with, as in the case of
an early act of Parliament which specified that legal pro-
ceedings be conducted in the English language, at a time
prior to the days when the East Midland dialect. became
classic English, and in an era when there was no English
language but only a variety of mutually incomprehensible
English dialects. An analogous situation arose in one of
the New England states when an act of Assembly required
the members of the Supreme Court to write opinions in all
cases, even when on circuit, a task which proved to be a
physical impossibility on account of pressure of business.
We need not go so far as some early commentators who
laid down the doctrine that a statute is void if impossible
to comply with, but merely observe that it is in abeyance
so long as the impossibility continues.
It cannot be stressed too often that the concept of
necessity is impossible of reduction to measured formula
or statement. There are too many kinds of necessity. 10
Furthermore legal history teaches us that to a considerable
6Cf. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 440 (1884).
7Ci. Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 16 (1906); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 90 (1907).
BVigeant v. Postal Telegraph Co., 260 Mass. 335 (1927).
ONewton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165 (1922).
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degree necessity varies with time, place and occasion. One
interesting kind of necessity is that, which sometimes
arises, of taking jurisdiction. It manifests itself in many
ways. One interesting way is to apply new concepts to old
forms of law, (which make no express provision for deal-
ing with the new material), by means of a legal fiction, for
fictions are often found to be necessary adjustments to
changes in environmental facts. A famous illustration of
this was the invention of the fiction, of implied promises in
quasi-contracts, devised to give a remedy in an epoch when
we find "conscience encroaching on the common law." An-
other way in which the principle has manifested itself is
illustrated by the assumption of equitable jurisdiction by
courts of common law-a procedure found to be absolutely
essential to the ends of justice where local prejudice or in-
herited difficulties have prevented the creation of separate
courts of equity.11 Very frequently the mystic phrase, "the
law implies," really covers an imputation of something
which does not exist-and is to that extent a fiction-an
equitable fiction, however, in the widest sense of the word
equitable, implying that which is requisite and essential to
the end of justice; in other words a resultant of the irres-
sistible pressure of social and jural necessity. In like man-
ner occasions arise when the principle communis error facit
jus is found to be binding on grounds of social and juristic
necessity ;12 but this doctrine is one to be applied with great
caution."
10 We find scattered throughout the reports such phrases as, ab-
solute necessity, apparent necessity, extreme necessity, imperious
necessity, juristic necessity, moral necessity, overruling necessity,
practical necessity, and urgent necessity. But where do we find in
any realm of social activity a concept free from a conflation or fusion
of elements ?
"lCf. Respublica v. Coates, 1 Yeates 2 (Pa. 1791); Haldane v.
Fisher, 1 Yeates 121 (Pa. 1792) ; Jordan v. Cooper, 3 Sergt. & R. 564,
578, 585 (Pa. 1818).
2
2Cf. Manchester v. Hough, Fed. Cas. 9,005 (1828), Story, J.;
O'Donell v. Glenn, 9 Mont. 452, 23 Pac. 1018 (1890); Caldwell v. Mc-
Laren, 9 App. Cas. 392, 409 (Eng. 1884).
"3Cf. McKean, Communis error facit jus, 34 Dick. L. Rev. 34-48
(1929).
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Strange as it now seems, it took many years of experi-
ence to convince leaders of thought that there is such a
concept as homicide by necessity. Chancellor Kent says
that the right of self-defense is part of the law of our
nature,1' and a priori philosophers assume that this view
has always prevailed; but the legal historian knows that in
England it was not until 1828 that the innocence of excus-
able homicide was expressly recognized. Prior to that
time, back to the days of "the English Justinian", it was
the law if a man under arrest had committed hom-
icide by misfortune or in his own defense and there was a
verdict found, "the king shall take him [the prisoner] in
his grace, if it please him."'15 Strictly speaking homicide
by necessity arises only in cases of self-defense. 6 Justifi-
able homicide, such as killing to prevent a felony, is not
homicide by necessity, although many writers and some
courts have assigned it to such a category, possibly be-
cause of the incidental employment of the term "neces-
sary" in instructions to juries as to the urgency and ex-
pediency of homicide by an officer; but, it is believed, that
there is more the concept of "not unreasonable" than of
essentiality when the term "necessity" is employed in this
class of cases.' 7  While it has been said that nature and
social duty cooperate in the repelling of force by force
where a felony is attempted upon the person, 8 the force
that a man may lawfully use in the protection of person
or property does not extend to the endangering of human
life or the infliction of great bodily harm, except in extreme
cases.19 Self-preservation alone does not justify homicide,
despite the theoretical disquisitions of some philosophers,
for the law does not approve of a man saving his life by
1l Kent. Corn. 48; 2 id. 15.
15Statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I, c. 9, (1277).
"1Cf. Logue v. Corn., 38 Pa. 265, 268 (1861); Queen v. Dudley, 14
Q. B. D., 273, 283 (Eng. 1884).
17Cf. State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 537 (1905); State v. Morgan,
3 Ired. 186, 193 (N. C. 1842).
'sCom. v. Riley, Thach. Cr. Cas. 471 (Mass. 1837).
'9 Braddy v. Hodges, 99 N. C. 319 (1889).
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killing an innocent and unoffending neighbor. 20  The trend
of opinion in regard to homicide in self-defense (or homi-
cide by necessity as it is often designated), is to the effect
that the defendant must show: (1) That he was not the
aggressor or provoker of strife;21 (2) That he could not
have avoided the resort to extreme measures with any
reasonable degree of personal safety; 2 (3) That his act
was prompted by an honest belief of imminent personal
danger and of a necessity to kill ;23 and (4) That he had
reasonable grounds for his belief as to the necessity of his
act.2' "The law of self-defence is a law of necessity, and
that necessity must be real, or bear all the semblance of
reality, and appear to admit of no other alternative, before
taking life will be justifiable or excusable." While there
are dicta to the contrary,26 the right of self-defense is re-
stricted to those who are blameless, and even then, only
where there is a reasonably apparent necessity for a resort
to steps taken in furtherance of such a right. The question
of the onus probandi in prosecutions for homicide where
self-defense is averred, is one of great interest. Undoubt-
edly it is for the state to prove the defendant's guilt, and
not for the defendant to prove his innocence. At the same
time there is a presumption that intentional killing is un-
lawful;7 and assuredly a plea of homicide by necessity
admits that the killing was intentional. Although the de-
fence of homicide by necessity is included under the gen-
2OArp v. State, 47 Ala. 5, 19 L. R. A. 357 (1893); State v. Weston,
109 Ore. 19 (1923); Queen v. Dudley, 14 Q. B. D. 273, 286 (Eng. 1884).
Cf. Fichte, The Science of Rights (Kroeger's transl. 1869) 170.
21State v. Ray, 166 N. C. 420, 432 (1914); 4 Vin. Abr. tit. Neces-
sity (1793 ed.) 536.
22U. S. v. Holmes, I Wall. Jr. 1, 22 (U. S. 1842).
2ASteinmeyer v. People, 95 Ill. 383 (1880); Com. v. Weathers, 7
Kulp, 1, 10 (Pa. 1892); U. S. v. Salandanan, 1 Philippines 478 (1902).
24People v. Lombard, 17 Cal. 317 (1861); People v. Williams, 240
Ill. 633, 644 (1909); Com. v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641 (1897); Reg. v.
Rose, 15 Cr. C. C. 540 (Eng. 1884).
26E. g.,--State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 594 (1900).
2lPeople v. Lamb, 17 Cal. 323 (1861); State v. Evans, 124 Mo.
397, 411 (1894); State v. Brittan, 89 N. C. 481, 502 (1883); Rex. v.
Greenacre, 8 C. & P. 35, 42 (Eng. 1837).
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eral issue, it is treated as a plea in the nature of confession
and avoidance.2 8 In civil cases this would cast upon the
defendant the onus of proving the matter set up in avoid-
ance; but it has been held, that in criminal cases it is not
necessary for a defendant to establish matter in excuse or
justification by a preponderance of evidence. 2 In other
words, the onus of showing justification, excuse or mitiga-
tion, is upon the prisoner, not beyond reasonable doubt nor
according to the preponderance of the testimony, but to
the satisfaction of the jury.30
The word "necessity" is frequently employed as a
mere synonym for "condition precedent", and is thus used
in referring to such questions as, the requirement of actual
notice of the retirement of a member of a partnership in
order to relieve such retiring partner from liability for sub-
sequently incurred obligations of the firm from which he
has withdrawn; and the essentiality of notice to an agent
of revocation of a power of attorney to convey real estate.
A very important branch of the law in which the word
"necessity" is widely employed is the subject of eminent
domain. Here the term necessity signifies something
which is reasonably serviceable in the furtherance of a
recognized public exigency. In view of the numerous ad-
mirable and well-indexed writings on the law of eminent
domain, there would appear to be no need of enlarging
upon this particular topic, further than to remark that
nothing but an abuse of power by the body entrusted with
the duty of making a finding "of necessity", in condemna-
tion proceedings, would justify a court in disturbing such
finding.A' Implied powers are often said to be such as are
necessary to carry into effect those which are expressly
granted, and are therefore presumed to be within the in-
tention of the grantor.2 Here the idea of necessity is one
2SRagsdale v4 State, 12 Ala. App. 1, 12 (1915).
29Tiffany v. Com., 121 Pa. 165, 181 (1888).
B0State v. Willis, 63 N. C. 28 (1868).
s8 Philadelphia v. Ward, 174 Pa. 45, 18 At1. 522 (1896).
8
2 City of Madison v. Daley, 58 Fed. 751, 755 (U. S. C. C. Dist.
Ind. 1893); People v. Chicago Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 283 (1889).
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of reasonableness and not of indispensability, and com-
prises that which is obviously appropriate and convenient
to carry out an express purpose;S8 but does not extend to
that which is merely profitable or advantageous," or but
remotely connected with the purposes of the grant," The
phrase "incidental power", is practically synonymous with
"implied power", for it has been defined as one that is
directly and immediately appropriate to the execution of
the specific power granted, and not one that has a slight
or remote relation to it.36
The far reaching principle de minimis non curat lex,
covers a vast number of rules of law. Its applicability is
based upon the principle of juristic necessity.3T A fre-
quently misleading phrase in legal terminology is that of
"easements by necessity", especially in the form "rights
of way by necessity". Too many people have been led
thereby to a belief that the doctrine confers a right to
treat the property of a stranger as subservient to their
needs. It is conceived that on the contrary, whenever the
right to an easement or quasi-easement is recognized by
courts of law or equity as deriving from "necessity", it
will be found to have arisen ex aequo et bono. The better
view in regard to pleading an easement "by necessity", is
that general terms are not sufficient.38
It can hardly have escaped the notice of those
who have given any thought to the subject of this
paper, that there is a variety of connotations of the
term necessity, ranging from indispensability and in-
evitability to convenience and utility. Thus the
certificate of necessity of the public service commission,
is based upon the reasonable requirements of the public.
83State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537, 545, 546 (1871).
34Citizens Electric Ilium. Co. v. Lackawanna & W. V. R. R. Co.,
255 Pa. 176, 184, 185 (1916).
35People v. Pullman Car Co., 175 Ill. 125, 137 (1898).
BsPeople v. Chicago Trust Co., 130 11. 268, 283 (1889).
8 7McKean, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429
(1927).
"SRoper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N. C. 161,
167 (1912).
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Where all the relevant facts have been considered and
weighed by a commission the general practice is for courts
of law to sustain its findings, unless clearly erroneous.8"
A certificate of necessity constitutes a finding of great or
urgent public convenience, and so great a public benefit
that the want of it would be a great public inconvenience.' 0
Of course a proper finding as to public convenience must
be substantially supported by sufficient evidence,4 1 and,
where such is the case, the courts lean toward resolving all
doubts in favor of the findings of a public service com-
mission.
Over a century ago, Chief Justice Parker, of Massa-
chusetts, recognized a principle of moral necessity, com-
paratively easy of apprehension but difficult to define. In
discussing the then recently recognized necessity of dis-
charging a jury for failure to come to an agreement, or for
other compelling cause, he said the compulsion was not
physical but "a moral necessity arising from the impossi-
bility of proceeding with the cause without producing evils
which ought not to be sustained. 42 Similarly it has been
recognized that the admission of dying declarations in
homicide cases is necessary at all times, for it is "a public
necessity which civilized society feels the pressure of, for
the protection of human life by the punishment of man-
slayers."'8 There is frequently an element of compulsion in
cases of moral necessity, which sometimes amounts to
irresistible force. Thus, a compliance by individuals or
corporations with the demands of civic or military neces-
sity might arise from a feeling of the moral obligation to
discharge the duties of good citizenship, or be prompted by
a prudent desire to avoid the uncomfortable consequences
likely to ensue from failure to observe such duties in time
of stress.
39Com. v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 405, 409, 46 At]. 124 (1900).
' 0Com. v. Cambridge, 7 Mass. 158, 167 (1810); Hunter v. Newport,
5 R. I. 325, 330 (1858).
"LUtilities Commission v. Toledo etc. R. R. Co., 286 Ill. 582, 589
(1919).
42 Com. v. Purchase, 2 Pick. 521, 525 (Mass. 1824).
'Com. v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 289, 39 Atl. 211 (1898).
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Very frequently the word "necessity" appears in in-
dexes as a heading for the topic Sunday laws. Much of the
history of Sunday observance and Sunday law could be re-
covered from the scholarly opinion of Chief Justice Clark,
of North Carolina, in the case of Rodney v. Robinson," if
the original authorities were lost. Virginia seems to have
been the first common law jurisdiction which enacted such
legislation, for she had a Sunday observance law three
years before the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock.
In the strict sense of the term "common law" there is no
Sunday observance requirement in that system of juris-
prudence (with the exception that Sunday is dies non
juridici by a canon of the Church incorporated into the
common law); but it is possible that there may be a few
jurisdictions which will be found to hold that the statute
29 Car. II, c. 7 (1688) (prototype of most American Sunday
laws), constitutes part of the local common law."5  In
general, Sunday laws in the United States, Canada and
other common law jurisdictions, are interpreted in the
spirit of the New Testament view that the Sabbath was
made for man. The basis is largely humanitarian, and
aimed against the economic coercion of employees and
others to work on a day of rest.46 Economic advantage or
reduction of expense is not considered a necessity within
"134 N. C. 503, 47 S. E. 19 (1904).
45See Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536 (1902). Cf. McKean,
British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. Pa. Law Rev. 195
(1929).
"The humanitarian basis of Sunday laws seems to be lost sight
of by extreme "Sabbatarians" and "Liberals" alike. A year or so ago
some religious bodies in Western Pennsylvania made public protest
against Sunday bathing and attempted to secure municipal legislation
against it. On the other hand, some "Liberals" have been agitating
for commercialized Sunday sports and amusements, overlooking the
attendant economic pressure on employees to work on a day of rest,
and, apparently unmindful of the consequent interference with the
religious liberty of such employees to attend Divine service, if they
so desire. Both views are opposed to the teachings of competent
authorities who believe that one day's rest in seven is essential to
the general welfare, and that irksome dictation is inconsistent with
the right to be let alone during a period of rest.
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the meaning of the exception "work of necessity", in Sun-
day laws; but avoidance of waste is authorized, such as
bringing in crops to avoid impairment or destruction by
the weather, transporting livestock to a place where they
can be watered, or protecting oneself against an abscond-
ing debtor. It is almost a universal rule in common law
jurisdictions that any act may be lawfully done on Sunday
which it is lawful to do on any other day, unless there be
some statute forbidding such conduct on Sunday. Acts of
mercy are generally specifically excepted from the opera-
tion of Sunday statutes, but, where such is not the case,
they are construed to be acts of necessity.
The basic principle of statutes of limitations is fre-
quently expressed in the phrase "statutes of repose". In
addition it may be observed that, under modern conditions,
it is a virtual impossibility for business men to keep vouch-
ers and other proofs of their transactions for an indefinite
period. Hence failure to bring suit prior to the expiration
of the time allowed by law will lead to forfeiture of a right
to proceed, if insisted upon by the defendant. This is rea-
sonable where a creditor or a tort victim has had a choice
as to the time of bringing an action; but where he has had
no option in the matter, and no opportunity has presented
itself for bringing suit, it would be unjust to bar his right
of action. In recognition of this principle, statutes of limi-
tations contain exceptions for the protection of infants and
certain other classes of helpless creditors or claimants
under disability. In addition, the law recognizes an excep-
tion of cases arising from invincible necessity, and gives
such exception the same force and effect that it does to
those disabilities which are expressly favored in the
statute.4 7 There are many legal principles which concur in
supporting this application of the law of necessity. Among
these may be mentioned the maxim cessante ratione legis
cessat ipsa lex, employed as a canon of statutory construc-
tion; and the familiar rule of public policy that the law
does not require impossibilities (which latter rule is, in its
' t Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 541 (U. S. 1867); Hill v. Phil-
lips, 14 R. I. 93 (1883).
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turn, a "law of necessity").
Unequivocal recognition of the inviolability of person
and property is an outstanding characteristic of our system
of law. That a man's house is his castle is a legal prin-
ciple which has passed into common speech, and further-
more, a trespass upon one's premises by three or more
persons, is an indictable offence at common law."' It fol-
lows that the law will tolerate encroachments upon the
rights of others by private acts in a very limited class of
cases, and only then upon principles of public policy. In
such exceptional cases the justification of an act, other-
wise tortious, is placed upon the ground of necessity and
must be pleaded as such. The rule in Mouse's Case,"9 that a
man may sacrifice the property of another to save his own
life, or that of another, is the starting point of most of the
earlier decisions in the law of cases of necessity, and is
regarded as axiomatic. Without mentioning this rule, a
few writers have cited the case of Laidlaw v. Sage,50 as an
extension of the doctrine of cases of necessity, by justify-
ing the action of a man who, in peril of death from an
assailant, interposes the body of an innocent bystander, as
a shield. It is earnestly submitted that such an interpreta-
tion of the case of Laidlaw v. Sage is incorrect; for the
opinion was that the act in question was involuntary on the
presumption that an act or omission done or neglected
under the influence of pressing danger, is done or neglected
involuntarily. The doctrine of Mouse's Case as to justifica-
tion of saving human life by acts which otherwise would
be trespasses, is well established in this country. Thus
where a sloop has been moored to another's dock to avoid
the perils of threatening storms, it is tortious for the dock-
owner to unmoor the vessel.5 1 So also it has been held that
48Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463, 473 (1909), Walker J. It
might be well, if writers on criminal law would lay emphasis upon the
rule of law stated in Saunders v. Gilbert, which is too frequently
ignored by high-handed contractors and golden-rule breaking auto-
mobile "tourists".
6912 Co. 63 (Eng. 1609).
50158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679 (1899).
52Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Att. 188 (1908).
248
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to forbid private citizens to arrest without a warrant would
endanger the safety of society. 52 All of which shows that
"the law of necessity***applies as well to personal as
to real estate; to goods as to houses; to life as to
property; in solitude as in a crowded city; in a state of
nature as in civil society :***And the common law
adopts the principle of the natural law, and places the
justification of an act otherwise tortious, precisely
upon the***ground of necessity.
53
An extreme application of the doctrine was made in
the case of Coimnonwealth v. Passmore," where Chief Justice
Tilghman held that "necessity justifies actions which would
otherwise be nuisance*** this necessity need not be abso-
lute, it is enough if it be reasonable." From the days when
the Israelitish land-owner was subject to military duty,
down through the times when the trinoda necessitas was
imposed upon the Anglo-Saxon land-holder, to the present
era when the owner of improved real estate in the United
States may be deprived of the uses of his premises for a
year and a day although guiltless of participation in the
offence for which he is penalized; there has never been a
time when the ownership of real estate was free from
burdens or exactions, more or less reasonable. Hence it is
not at all surprising to find embodied in the common law
the rule that an "entry upon land to save goods which are
in jeopardy of being lost or destroyed by water, fire or any
like danger, is not a trespass;***' ' 5  This rule may be
supported in part by the familiar principle de minimis non
curat lex, in addition to the law of necessity by which such
entry finds its justification. Where, however, substantial
damage is caused by an encroachment upon a man's prop-
erty for the purpose of preventing injury or destruction
of the goods of the salvor, it is submitted that, ex aequo et
"2Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814).
"3American Print Works v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 248, 257, 258 (N.
J. 1847).
541 Serg. & R., 217 (Pa. 1814).
5 Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873), Gray, C, J.
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bono, damage caused thereby should be paid for.56 Cases to
the contrary, of which Cope v. Sharp57 is a type, are harsh,
to say the least, when they permit a man to impose a
burden of expense upon the shoulders of a third party; and
are clearly opposed to the principle laid down by Mr.
Justice Holmes in the case of Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter,8 that "All rights tend to declare themselves
absolute to their logical extremes. Yet all in fact are
limited by the neighborhood principles of policy which are
other than those on which the particular right is founded
and which become strong enough to hold their own when
a certain point is reached." There ought to be no vested
right in anyone to benefit himself by inflicting a loss on
another which he should in all fairness be required to pay;
and this policy seems to permeate the French law which
provides that the user of a right of way of necessity must
pay an indemnity equivalent to the damage he may oc-
casion.
59
"***the law itself, and the administration of it, must
yield to that to which everything must bend-to
necessity.60 The law, in its most positive and peremp-
tory injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does
in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling
***impossibilities;1 and the administration of law
must adopt that general exception in the consideration
of all particular cases. In the performance of that duty
it has three points to which its attention must be
directed: In the first place, it must see that the
nature of the necessity pleaded be such as the law it-
self would respect; for there may be a necessity which
it would not. A necessity created by a man's own act,
56Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 564, 124 N.
W. 221. (1910). Cf.: Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484, 487, 488 (1872);
Chambers v. Bedell, 2 W. & S. 225 (Pa. 1841), dictum; Anthony v.
Haney, 8 Bing. 186, 193 (Eng. 1832), dictum; Holmes, The Common
Law, 148-149 (1881).
57(1910) 1 K. B. 168.
58209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908).
59Cachard, French Civil Code, Arts. 682-685 (1930 ed.).
6ORespublica v. Sparhawk, 1 DalI. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788); Harrison
v. Wisdom, 7 Heisk. 99, 116 (Tenn. 1872).
61Compare the canon law maxim, Nemno obligatur ad impossibile.
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with a fair previous knowledge of the consequences
that would follow, and under circumstances which he
had then a power of controlling, is of that nature.
6 2
Secondly, that the party who was so placed used all
practical endeavours to surmount the difficulties
which already formed the necessity, and which on fair
trial he found insurmountable. I do not mean all the
endeavours which the wit of man, as it exists in the
acutest understanding, might suggest, but such as may
reasonably be expected from a fair degree of discretion
and an ordinary knowledge of business. 63 Thirdly,
that all this shall appear by distinct and unsuspected
testimony ;"4 for the positive injunctions of the law, if
proved to be violated, can give away to nothing but
the clearest proof of the necessity that compelled the
violation." 65
FREDERICK G. McKEAN, JR.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
*2State v. Ray, 166 N. C. 420, 430-1 (1914); 1 East, P. C. 273
(1806 ed.); Vin. Abridg., Vol. IV. tit. Necessity 539 (1793 ed.).
6sPeople v. Davis, 300 Ill. 226, 235 (1921); Com. v. McGowan,
189 Pa. 641 (1899); Reg. v. Rose, 15 Cr. C. C. 540 (Eng. 1884).
'4State v. Smith, 127 Iowa, 534, 537 (1905) semble; Troewert v.
Decker, 51 Wis. 46 (1881).
65The Generous, 2 Dod. 323, 324 (Eng. 1818) Sir W. Scott Lord
Stoweil.
